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Continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) protocols with discrete modulation are
interesting due to their experimental simplicity, but their security analysis is less advanced than
that of Gaussian modulation schemes. We analyze the security of two variants of CV-QKD protocol
with quaternary modulation against collective attacks in the asymptotic limit. Our security analysis
is based on the numerical optimization of the asymptotic key rate formula with a photon number
cutoff assumption that truncates the dimension of the system. When the cutoff photon number
is chosen to be sufficiently large, our results do not depend on the specific choice of cutoff. Our
analysis shows that this protocol can achieve much higher key rates over long distances compared
with binary and ternary modulation schemes and yield key rates comparable to Gaussian modulation
schemes. Furthermore, our security analysis method allows us to evaluate variations of the discrete-
modulated protocols, including direct and reverse reconciliation, and also postselection strategies.
We also demonstrate that postselection in combination with reverse reconciliation can improve the
key rates.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2] is an important
crytographic primitive in the era of quantum technology
since it enables two honest parties, traditionally known as
Alice and Bob, to establish information-theoretically se-
cure keys against any eavesdropper (Eve) who is bound
by the laws of quantum mechanics. By now, there are
plenty of QKD protocols (see [3] for a review), which
can be categorized into two families according to their
detection technology: discrete variable (DV) and con-
tinuous variable (CV). DV-QKD protocols like BB84 [1]
are realized by encoding the information into qubit-like
degree of freedom of photons, such as polarization and
time-bin, and by measuring with single-photon detectors.
DV-QKD enjoys a great success in experimental imple-
mentations and corresponding security analyses, and can
currently reach longer distances than CV-QKD. However,
CV-QKD (e.g. see Refs. [4–6]) uses detection technology
that is widely used in modern optical (classical) commu-
nication methods, which turns those classical methods
and CV-QKD apparatus into nearly identical devices.
This gives CV-QKD a competitive edge for the large-
scale deployment in quantum-secured networks.
A main security proof technique for CV-QKD is the
optimality of Gaussian attacks [7, 8] for protocols with
Gaussian modulation. In fact, security proofs are quite
mature for CV-QKD with Gaussian modulation (see [9]
for a review). This type of protocols puts a lot of de-
mands on the modulation devices and classical error cor-
rection protocols. In addition, the effect of finite constel-
lation needs to be taken into account carefully [10, 11].
In probing quantumness of devices using coherent states,
we noticed that even a small number of coherent states
has the same quantumness verifciation power as a Gaus-
sian modulation of states [12]. We thus expect that a
discrete-modulated CV-QKD protocol will approach the
performance of Gaussian modulated CV-QKD with just
a few different modulation amplitudes. However, the cor-
responding security proof is more involved due to missing
analytical tools. The binary [13] and ternary modulation
schemes [14] have been proved secure against collective
attacks. Unfortunately, the key rates obtained are not
tight and the proof technique is not expected to be gener-
alizable to discrete modulation schemes with more states.
Moreover, these proofs are valid only if the receiver ob-
serves a Gaussian distribution of outcomes. For the qua-
ternary modulation scheme, also known as quadrature
phase-shift keying scheme, its security was previously an-
alyzed under the assumption of linear bosonic channels
[15] or Gaussian attacks [16], which restricts Eve’s ability.
Also the key rate obtained in Ref. [15] is not expected
to be tight. Recently, there is a security analysis [17]
of the quaternary modulation scheme with heterodyne
detection. This security analysis uses a reduction to the
Gaussian optimality proof method and applies a semidef-
inite program (SDP) technique with a photon number
cutoff assumption. As we show in our contribution, one
can improve their key rates. Futhermore, our approach
can be extended to variants of the protocol using homo-
dyne measurements. Our approach and proof technique
will also allow postselection [18, 19], which is commonly
done for the classical telecommunication protocols and
DV-QKD protocols but not considered in Ref. [17] due
to the proof technique.
In this work, we consider two variants of the quadra-
ture phase-shift keying modulation scheme: one with ho-
modyne detection and the other with heterodyne detec-
tion. For these two variants, we analyze the security
against collective attacks in the asymptotic limit. Re-
markably, compared with the similar heterodyne scheme
considered in Ref. [17], we obtain quite higher key rates.
We want to point out that this result can be further
improved by a suitable choice of key map and error-
2correction protocol. Since our method does not invoke
the argument about optimality of Gaussian attacks, we
also investigate the effects of postselection in which case
Gaussian attacks are not known to be optimal. Previ-
ously, postselection was considered for discrete modula-
tion scheme under a restricted class of attacks [16, 20].
From our results, we observe that postselection can im-
prove the key rates under collective attacks. We remark
that our security proof method works for both direct rec-
onciliation and reverse reconciliation protocols. However,
we focus on reverse reconciliation in this work since re-
verse reconciliation is known to have better performance
than the direct reconciliation in terms of transmission
distances. For our security analysis, we rely on the nu-
merical methods developed in Refs. [21, 22] and we use
the version of Ref. [22] to prove the security against
collective attacks in the asymptotic limit. In order to
perform such an optimization numerically, we impose
the same photon number cutoff assumption considered in
Ref. [17]. Although ultimately one would like to prove
the security without this assumption, this assumption is
reasonable because we notice that when the cutoff photon
number is much larger than the mean photon number,
we numerically verify that our key rate results do not
depend on the choice of cutoff. We leave it as the future
work to remove this assumption. It is also interesting to
point out that our approach can be easily generalized to
other discrete modulation schemes beyond four coherent
states.
The rest of the paper is outlined as follows. In Sec. II,
we present two variants of the protocol: protocol 1 uses
the homodyne detection and only uses two out of four
states to generate keys; protocol 2 uses the heterodyne
detection and encodes 2-bit information in each round.
In Sec. III, we first review the relevant numerical ap-
proach used for this work, discuss the photon number
cutoff assumption and then present the specific setup of
the optimization problems for those two protocols, such
as choices of constraints, the postprocessing map and the
pinching map related to the key map. We then perform
simulations and show the simulation results in Sec. IV.
Finally, we summarize the results and provides insights
for the future direction in Sec. V. We discuss some tech-
nical details in the appendixes.
II. DESCRIPTION OF PROTOCOLS
In the following description, let [N ] denote the set of
positive integers from 1 to N . When Greek letters α, γ
are put in the bra-ket notation, we refer to coherent states
with amplitude α or γ.
A. Protocol 1: with homodyne detection
(1). State preparation. For each round k ∈ [N ]
(where N is sufficiently large), according to the
probability distribution (pA2 ,
pA
2 ,
1−pA
2 ,
1−pA
2 ), Al-
ice prepares a coherent state |ψk〉 from the set
{|α〉 , |−α〉 , |iα〉 , |−iα〉}, where α ∈ R is pre-
determined. Alice sends this state to Bob through
an insecure quantum channel.
(2). Measurement. After receiving Alice’s state, Bob
performs the homodyne measurement on the state.
Bob generates a random bit bk according to the
probability distribution (pB, 1 − pB). If bk = 0,
he measures the q quadrature and if bk = 1, he
measures the p quadrature. He obtains the mea-
surement outcome yk ∈ R.
(3). Announcement and sifting. After N rounds of first
two steps, Alice and Bob communicate via the au-
thenticated classical channel to partition all the
rounds [N ] into four subsets defined as
Iqq = {k ∈ [N ] : |ψk〉 ∈ {|α〉 , |−α〉}, bk = 0},
Iqp = {k ∈ [N ] : |ψk〉 ∈ {|α〉 , |−α〉}, bk = 1},
Ipq = {k ∈ [N ] : |ψk〉 ∈ {|iα〉 , |−iα〉}, bk = 0},
Ipp = {k ∈ [N ] : |ψk〉 ∈ {|iα〉 , |−iα〉}, bk = 1}.
(1)
Then Alice and Bob randomly select a small test
subset Iqq,test ⊂ Iqq . This allows them to define
Ikey as the subset of Iqq after removing Iqq,test
and to define Itest = Iqq,test ∪ Iqp ∪ Ipq ∪ Ipp. Let
m denote the size of the index set Ikey and let f
be a bijective function from [m] = {1, 2, . . . ,m}
to Ikey. After sifting, Alice sets her string X =
(x1, x2, . . . , xm) according to the rule
∀j ∈ [m], xj =
{
0 if
∣∣ψf(j)〉 = |α〉 ,
1 if
∣∣ψf(j)〉 = |−α〉 . (2)
(4). Parameter estimation. Alice and Bob perform pa-
rameter estimation by disclosing all the informa-
tion in the rounds indexed by the test set Itest. To
perform such an analysis, they process the data by
computing quantities like the first and second mo-
ments of q and p quadratures conditioned on each of
four states that Alice sends. These quantities allow
them to constrain their joint state ρAB. They then
calculate the secret key rate according to the op-
timization problem presented in Eq. (16). If their
analysis shows that no secret keys can be generated,
then they abort the protocol. Otherwise, they pro-
ceed.
(5). Reverse reconciliation key map. Bob performs a
key map to obtain his raw key string. This key
map discretizes his measurement outcome yk to an
element in the set {0, 1,⊥} for each k ∈ Ikey. For
each j ∈ [m], Bob sets zj according to the rule
zj =

0 if yf(j) ∈ [∆c,∞),
1 if yf(j) ∈ (−∞,−∆c],
⊥ if yf(j) ∈ (−∆c,∆c).
(3)
3Note that ∆c ≥ 0 is a parameter related to the
postselection. A protocol without postselection can
set ∆c = 0. At end of this process, Bob has a
string Z = (z1, z2, . . . , zm). In communication be-
tween Alice and Bob, positions with the symbol ⊥
are deleted from their strings. With a slight abuse
of notation, we use X,Z to mean the strings after
removing the positions related to ⊥. Z is called the
raw key string.
(6). Error correction and privacy amplification. Alice
and Bob then apply a suitable error correction pro-
tocol and a privacy amplification protocol to gen-
erate a secret key.
Remark: In the description above, Alice and Bob es-
sentially only use a subset of Iqq to generate keys. For
this specific setup, we consider asymmetric roles of these
four states and asymmetric choice of quadrature mea-
surements. In the asymptotic limit, we can set pA and
pB arbitrarily close to 1 so that the sifting factor of the
protocol is 1 (in the absence of postselection) [23]. In
this sense, Alice’s signal states |iα〉 and |−iα〉 and Bob’s
p quadrature measurement data are only used to probe
eavesdropping activities. One needs to optimize pA and
pB when the finite-size effects are taken into considera-
tion. For another variant of this protocol, one may choose
pA = pB =
1
2 and allow Alice and Bob to generate keys
from both Iqq and Ipp. Then the protocol would have
1
2 sifting factor (in the absence of postselection). Since
the essential idea of our security proof in the asymptotic
limit is the same, we consider the asymmetric version to
maximize the sifting factor in this work.
B. Protocol 2: with heterodyne detection
This variant differs from the protocol 1 in the steps
(2), (3), (5).
(1). State preparation. Like the protocol 1, Alice prepares
one of those four signal states with an equal probability
(pA =
1
2 ) and sends to Bob.
(2’). Measurement. Upon receiving Alice’s state, Bob per-
forms the heterodyne measurement on the state, which
can be described by a positive operator-valued measure
(POVM) {Eγ = 1pi |γ〉〈γ| : γ ∈ C}. After applying this
POVM, he obtains the measurement outcome yk ∈ C.
(3’). Announcement and sifting. After N rounds of first
two steps, Alice and Bob determine a small subset
Itest ⊂ [N ]. Rounds indexed by the set Itest are used
for parameter estimation. They will use the remaining
rounds indexed by Ikey = [N ]/Itest to generate keys.
Let m denote the size of the index set Ikey and let f
be a bijective function from [m] to Ikey. After sift-
ing, Alice obtains her string X = (x1, . . . , xm) by the
following rule
∀j ∈ [m], xj =

0 if
∣∣ψf(j)〉 = |α〉 ,
1 if
∣∣ψf(j)〉 = |iα〉 ,
2 if
∣∣ψf(j)〉 = |−α〉 ,
3 if
∣∣ψf(j)〉 = |−iα〉 .
(4)
(4). Parameter estimation. As with the protocol 1, Al-
ice and Bob perform parameter estimation to decide
whether they abort the protocol.
(5’). Reverse reconciliation key map. Bob performs a key
map to obtain his raw key string. This key map dis-
cretizes his measurement outcome yk to an element in
the set {0, 1, 2, 3,⊥} for each k ∈ Ikey. As yk ∈ C,
we write yk = |yk|eiθk , where θk ∈ [−pi4 , 7pi4 ). Bob sets
each zj of his key string Z = (z1, . . . , zm) according to
the rule
zj =

0 if θf(j) ∈ [−pi4 +∆p, pi4 −∆p) and
∣∣yf(j)∣∣ ≥ ∆a,
1 if θf(j) ∈ [pi4 +∆p, 3pi4 −∆p) and
∣∣yf(j)∣∣ ≥ ∆a,
2 if θf(j) ∈ [ 3pi4 +∆p, 5pi4 −∆p) and
∣∣yf(j)∣∣ ≥ ∆a,
3 if θf(j) ∈ [ 5pi4 +∆p, 7pi4 −∆p) and
∣∣yf(j)∣∣ ≥ ∆a,
⊥ if θf(j) and
∣∣yf(j)∣∣ are none of the above.
(5)
∆a ≥ 0 and ∆p ≥ 0 are two parameters related to
postselection. A protocol without postselection can set
∆a = ∆p = 0. This key map is depicted in Fig. 1.
Like the protocol 1, positions with the symbol ⊥ are
deleted from their strings. Again, we use X,Z to mean
the strings after removing the positions related to ⊥.
Z is called the raw key string.
(6). Error correction and privacy amplification. As with the
protocol 1, they perform error correction and privacy
amplification to generate a secret key.
Alice and Bob may decide to recast their strings to bi-
nary strings before or during the error correction step
depending on their choice of error-correcting code. For
the consistency of our presentation, we use the alphabet
{0, 1, 2, 3} in the following discussion.
III. SECURITY PROOF APPROACH
Our security proof applies the numerical key rate cal-
culation framework developed in Refs. [21, 22], which al-
lows us to calculate the secret key rate against collective
attacks in the asymptotic limit. Specifically, we imple-
ment the approach in Ref. [22] to solve the key rate opti-
mization problem in this work. We begin with reviewing
relevant components of the key rate calculation. For the
purpose of reviewing, we keep this part of discussion gen-
eral. We direct readers to Refs. [21, 22] for the derivation
of the key rate optimization problem and specifically to
both Ref. [22] and Appendix A for the technical details
regarding the framework of handling the postprocessing
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FIG. 1. Key map for protocol 2. When Bob has a measure-
ment outcome γ ∈ C, if γ is in one of the four shaded areas,
then Bob maps the measurement outcome to the correspond-
ing value of that area for his key string. If γ is not in the
shaded areas, Bob obtains the symbol ⊥. ∆a and ∆p are two
parameters related to postselection.
steps of the protocol. We then briefly discuss the pho-
ton number cutoff assumption. Finally, we present the
specific numerical optimization problems for these two
protocols considered in this work.
A. Numerical method background
We first review the source-replacement scheme, which
allows us to recast a prepare-and-measure protocol into
an entanglement-based protocol. In the asymptotic limit
and under collective attacks, the key rate formula is given
by the well-known Devetak-Winter formula [24]. We then
briefly discuss how to reformulate Devetak-Winter for-
mula to obtain the relevant convex objective function for
the numerical optimization. Finally, we discuss the fea-
sible set of our optimization problem.
1. Source-replacement scheme
Both protocols presented in Sec. II are prepare-
and-measure schemes. When we prove the security of
a prepare-and-measure scheme, we apply the source-
replacement scheme [25, 26] to obtain an equivalent
entanglement-based scheme and prove the security of the
entanglement-based scheme, which is easier to analyze.
The key rate that we obtain from this entanglement-
based scheme is also the key rate for the corresponding
prepare-and-measure scheme.
If Alice prepares states from the ensemble {|ϕx〉 , px}
in the prepare-and-measure scheme, by the source-
replacement scheme, Alice effectively prepares the fol-
lowing bipartite state in the entanglement-based scheme:
|Ψ〉AA′ =
∑
x
√
px |x〉A |ϕx〉A′ , (6)
where Alice keeps the registerA and sendsA′ to Bob via a
quantum channel. For both protocols considered in this
work, {|ϕx〉} = {|α〉 , |−α〉 , |iα〉 , |−iα〉}. To determine
which state she sends to Bob, Alice performs a local mea-
surement described by a POVMMA = {MxA = |x〉〈x|} on
the register A. Upon obtaining a measurement result x,
Alice effectively sends to Bob the state |ϕx〉. After the
signal in register A′ is transmitted via the quantum chan-
nel, which is described by a completely positive and trace
preserving (CPTP) map EA′→B , the bipartite state ρAB
is obtained as
ρAB = (1A ⊗ EA′→B)(|Ψ〉〈Ψ|AA′). (7)
Bob then performs a measurement on the register B to
obtain his measurement result. When Alice performs a
projective measurement |x〉〈x|, the corresponding condi-
tional state ρxB that Bob receives is defined as
ρxB =
1
px
TrA[ρAB(|x〉〈x|A ⊗ 1B)]. (8)
2. Key rate formula
The secret key rate under collective attacks in the
asymptotic limit is given by the well-known Devetak-
Winter formula [24]. In the case of reverse reconciliation
[5, 27], this formula reads
R∞ = ppass
(
I(X;Z) −max
ρ∈S
χ(Z : E)
)
, (9)
where I(X;Z) is the classical mutual information be-
tween Alice’s stringX and the raw key string Z, χ(Z : E)
is the Holevo information that quantifies Eve’s knowledge
about the raw key string Z and ppass is the sifting proba-
bility, that is, the probability that a given round is used
for key generation after the sifting step. The set S con-
tains all density operators compatible with experimental
observations, which we will discuss later. One can rewrite
the Devetak-Winter formula as
R∞ = ppass
(
min
ρ∈S
H(Z|E) −H(Z|X)
)
, (10)
where H(Z|E) and H(Z|X) are conditional von Neu-
mann (Shannon) entropies.
In this formula, H(Z|X) is amount of information leak-
age during the error correction step performed at the
Shannon limit. In reality, since the error correction can-
not be done at the Shannon limit, to take the inefficiency
5of error correction into account, we replace this term by
the actual amount of information leakage per signal (de-
noted by δEC) during the error correction step.
The crucial step to turn this problem into a convex
optimization problem is to rewrite H(Z|E) in terms of
Alice and Bob’s bipartite quantum state ρAB. As shown
in Refs. [21, 22], the key rate expression can be reformu-
lated as
R∞ = min
ρAB∈S
D(G(ρAB)||Z(G(ρAB)))− ppassδEC . (11)
We now explain components in this equation.
D(ρ||σ) = Tr(ρ log2 ρ)− Tr(ρ log2 σ) is the quantum rel-
ative entropy. G is a completely positive and trace non-
increasing map. According to Ref. [22], G describes sev-
eral classical postprocessing steps of the protocol in terms
of actions on the bipartite state ρAB. Briefly speaking,
G is composed of an announcement map A, a sifting pro-
jection Π and a key map isometry V . The roles are ex-
plained as below:
i) A is a CPTP map that introduces classical registers
A˜ and B˜ to store announcements and also introduces
quantum registers A and B to store measurement out-
comes in a coherent fashion (via isometries).
ii) The sifting projection Π projects the state after an-
nouncements to the subspace spanned by announce-
ment outcomes that are kept for the key generation
purpose.
iii) The key map isometry V then utilizes classical an-
nouncement registers and quantum measurement out-
come registers to perform the key map step described
in the protocol and stores the result of key map to a
quantum register R.
Thus, G(σ) = VΠA(σ)ΠV † for an input state σ. We re-
mark that this output state may be subnormalized. The
normalization factor is actually ppass. This explains why
the factor ppass is not shown in front of the first term in
Eq. (11).
Finally, Z is a pinching quantum channel, which com-
pletely dephases the register R to read out the result of
key map. If {Zj} is the projective measurement that can
be used to obtain the result of key map from the register
R, then for an input state σ,
Z(σ) =
∑
j
ZjσZj . (12)
3. Constraints
We now explain the feasible set S of our optimization
problem. S is the set of bipartite density operators ρAB
compatible with experimental observations. If {Γi|Γi =
Γ†i , 1 ≤ i ≤ M} is the set of experimental observables
for some integer M and {γi ∈ R|1 ≤ i ≤ M} is the
corresponding set of expectation values observed for each
Γi, then the set S that we want to optimize over is defined
as
S = {ρ ≥ 0|Tr(ρΓi) = γi, ∀i}. (13)
In particular, we include the identity operator in the set
{Γi} to make sure Tr(ρ) = 1. For a prepare-and-measure
scheme, since Eve cannot modify Alice’s system A, we
additionally require ρA = TrB(ρAB) is fixed and given
by
ρA =
∑
x,x′
√
pxpx′ 〈ϕx′ |ϕx〉 |x〉〈x′|A . (14)
A final remark is that this optimization problem is a
convex optimization problem and in particular, it is an
SDP problem. The objective function here is the quan-
tum relative entropy function whose arguments involve
additional linear maps and it is a nonlinear convex func-
tion of ρAB since quantum relative entropy is jointly con-
vex in both arguments. The feasible set is a convex set
inside the positive semidefinite cone.
B. Photon number cutoff assumption
The key rate optimization problem in Eq. (11) involves
optimizing over all possible bipartite states ρAB in the
feasible set S. The number of free variables depends on
the size of ρAB. In order to numerically perform the op-
timization by computer optimization packages, we can
only deal with finite-dimensional ρAB. In our optimiza-
tion problem, as we can see from the source-replacement
scheme, the dimension of Alice’s system A is determined
by the number of different signal states that she prepares.
In both protocols considered in this work, the dimension
of the register A is 4. However, since the state that Bob
receives is an optical mode and in principle can be manip-
ulated by Eve, Bob’ state lives in an infinite-dimensional
Hilbert space HB . A basis for this Hilbert space is the
photon number states {|n〉 : n ∈ N}. We immediately
see that Bob’s POVM elements are infinite-dimensional
operators and ρAB is also infinite-dimensional. For DV-
QKD, one method to reduce the dimension of the sys-
tem is to apply a squashing model [28–30] for the pro-
tocol to obtain a lower-dimensional representation of his
POVM. This is possible for many DV-QKD protocols
since one can explicitly formulate the squashing model.
However, it is not clear how one can formulate a squash-
ing model for CV systems. Instead, we have to impose an
additional assumption in this work in order to perform
the numerical optimization. This additional assumption
is what we refer as the photon number cutoff assump-
tion. We impose the assumption that Bob’s system lives
in the Hilbert space HB = span{|0〉 , |1〉 , . . . , |Nc〉} for
some cutoff photon number Nc. Namely, if we define
6ΠNc =
Nc∑
n=0
|n〉〈n| with a suitable choice of photon num-
ber cutoff parameterNc, we assume ρ = ΠNcρΠNc for the
state ρ under consideration. This photon number cutoff
assumption allows us to truncate the infinite-dimensional
Hilbert space. If Nc is chosen to be large enough, this
assumption is a reasonable working assumption based on
the following observations:
i) Bob can obtain the mean photon number nx :=
Tr(ρxBnˆ) of each conditional state ρ
x
B via homodyne or
heterodyne measurements, where nˆ denotes the num-
ber operator.
ii) Since nx is known, we can pick Nc ∈ N such that
Nc is much larger than nx for each x ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}.
For such a choice of Nc, the probability of finding the
state to have a photon number n ≤ Nc is close to
1. This suggests that the contribution from n > Nc
photon subspace becomes negligible. Similarly, the off-
diagonal blocks (1−ΠNc)ρΠNc and ΠNcρ(1−ΠNc) also
have vanishing contributions.
iii) We can increase Nc to have a numerical verification
that the key rate is unchanged after we choose large
enough Nc.
This photon number cutoff assumption renders the nu-
merical optimization of the key rate problem feasible. We
point out that even though this assumption sounds rea-
sonable, one will have to deliver an exact analysis to re-
move this assumption for a full security proof. In this
sense, our proof is restricted. Nevertheless, we expect
the key rates of these protocols will not be affected much
by this working assumption. One needs to combine ap-
propriate analytical tools, such as a CV version of the
squashing model or a tight error analysis of the key rate
due to the photon number cutoff, to reach a complete
security proof against collective attacks in the asymp-
totic limit. Then one needs to apply appropriate tools
like quantum de Finetti representation theorem for CV-
QKD [31] to reach a full composable security proof [32].
C. Optimization problem for protocol 1
(homodyne detection)
Let aˆ and aˆ† be the annihilation and creation operators
of a single-mode state, respectively, and they obey the
commutation relation [aˆ, aˆ†] = 1. To be consistent in
this work, we define the quadrature operators qˆ and pˆ as
qˆ =
1√
2
(aˆ† + aˆ), pˆ =
i√
2
(aˆ† − aˆ). (15)
They obey the commutation relation [qˆ, pˆ] = i.
From the homodyne measurement, we can obtain ex-
pectation values of the first and second moments of the
quadrature operators 〈qˆ〉, 〈qˆ2〉, 〈pˆ〉 and 〈pˆ2〉. We can
calculate the mean photon number of each conditional
state ρxB from the homodyne measurement outcomes
since nˆ = 12 (qˆ
2 + pˆ2 − 1). In addition to nˆ, we define
an operator dˆ = qˆ2− pˆ2 = aˆ2+(aˆ†)2 to utilize the second
moment observations 〈qˆ2〉 and 〈pˆ2〉 to constrain ρAB.
The relevant optimization problem is
minimize D(G(ρAB)||Z(G(ρAB)))
subject to:
Tr[ρAB(|x〉〈x|A ⊗ qˆ)] = px〈qˆ〉x,
Tr[ρAB(|x〉〈x|A ⊗ pˆ)] = px〈pˆ〉x,
Tr[ρAB(|x〉〈x|A ⊗ nˆ)] = px〈nˆ〉x,
Tr
[
ρAB(|x〉〈x|A ⊗ dˆ)
]
= px〈dˆ〉x,
Tr[ρAB] = 1,
TrB[ρAB] =
3∑
i,j=0
√
pipj 〈ϕj |ϕi〉 |i〉〈j|A ,
ρAB ≥ 0,
(16)
where x ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} and 〈qˆ〉x, 〈pˆ〉x, 〈nˆ〉x, 〈dˆ〉x denote the
corresponding expectation values of operators qˆ, pˆ, nˆ, dˆ
for the conditional state ρxB, respectively. In Appendix
B, we discuss how we make these operators finite-
dimensional under the photon number cutoff assumption.
We remark that one can add more fine-grained con-
straints using the POVM description of homodyne mea-
surements or using the interval operators I0, I1 which we
will define shortly. Additional constraints can only im-
prove the key rate as it reduces the size of the feasible set
S. Nevertheless, we observe that this set of constraints
has already given us quite tight key rates. We expect
that additional constraints will provide only marginal im-
provements. For the ease of presentation, we choose this
set of coarse-grained constraints.
We now specify the maps G and Z. For the reverse
reconciliation, the postprocessing map G(σ) = KσK† is
given by the following Kraus operator
K =
1∑
z=0
|z〉R ⊗ (|0〉〈0|+ |1〉〈1|)A ⊗ (
√
Iz)B, (17)
where I0 and I1 are interval operators defined in terms of
projections onto (improper) eigenstates of q quadrature:
I0 =
∫ ∞
∆c
dq |q〉〈q| , I1 =
∫ −∆c
−∞
dq |q〉〈q| . (18)
In the definition of K, we project Alice’s register A onto
the subspace spanned by first two basis states (which
are related to the states |α〉 and |−α〉) and act on Bob’s
register by interval operators from the q quadrature mea-
surement since we generate keys only when Alice sends
|α〉 or |−α〉 and when Bob performs q quadrature mea-
surements in this protocol. We remark how the posts-
election is handled in our security proof. Since ∆c is a
7postselection parameter, the effect of postselection is re-
flected in the definition of interval operators which are
used in the postprocessing map G. Finally, the pinch-
ing quantum channel Z is described by the projections
Z0 = |0〉〈0|R ⊗ 1AB and Z1 = |1〉〈1|R ⊗ 1AB.
We remark that we have made an additional simpli-
fication for the Kraus operator K. Unlike the general
discussion in Sec. III A or in Ref. [22], we do not intro-
duce the registers A˜, B˜, A and B in the postprocessing
map G for this protocol. The aim of such a simplification
is to reduce the total dimension of the quantum states in
the key rate optimization without affecting the calculated
key rate. We provide a detailed analysis in Appendix A
to explain why such a simplification can be made. Here,
we discuss the ideas behind this simplification:
i) The quantum register A is Alice’s private register that
stores her measurement outcome after she performs
her POVM {MxA} on the register A in a coherent fash-
ion. Since Eve has no access to the register A, Alice
can choose to first perform a coarse-grained measure-
ment that only introduces the announcement regis-
ter A˜ and then perform a refined measurement condi-
tioned on the announcements, which is described by a
local isometry. Moreover, in the reverse reconciliation
scheme, since the key map isometry V does not de-
pend on Alice’s measurement outcome, the isometry
for the refined measurement commutes with both the
key map isometry V and the pinching map Z. As our
objective function is invariant under this type of local
isometries, we can choose not to apply this isometry
and thus, we do not introduce the register A.
ii) In the announcement step, Alice and Bob each an-
nounces whether a given round is kept for the key
generation. Then the sifting process keeps only one
announcement outcome, that is, when they both de-
cide to keep the round. So, both classical registers A˜
and B˜ after applying the sifting projection Π are effec-
tively one-dimensional. We then use another property
of the quantum relative entropy regarding quantum-
classical states to show that the calculated key rates
remain the same if we omit the registers A˜ and B˜.
iii) The key map in this protocol only uses the coarse-
grained information about Bob’s measurement out-
comes, that is, in which interval Bob’s measurement
outcome lies. As with the previous discussion about
the register A, we can view Bob’s measurement in two
steps. At the first step, Bob performs a coarse-grained
measurement in a coherent fashion to store the desired
coarse-grained outcomes in the register B. At the sec-
ond step, Bob performs a refined measurement con-
ditioned on the coarse-grained information to update
the register B, which is described by a local isome-
try (denoted by W ). Since the key map only uses the
coarse-grained information, the key map isometry V
effectively needs to first undo the isometry W . So,
we can choose not to perform the isometry W and let
the key map isometry V use the coarse-grained infor-
mation directly. This means the calculated key rate
remains the same after we ignore the isometry W . In
this case, the key map isometry V simply copies the
register B to the register R. Thus, we combine these
two registers and retain the name of R. The calculated
key rate is unaffected because combining two identical
registers can be described by an isometry.
D. Optimization problem for protocol 2
(heterodyne detection)
The optimization problem for the protocol 2 has es-
sentially the same form as described in Eq. (16). The
differences here are that expectation values are now ob-
tained via the heterodyne detection, and the postpro-
cessing map G and the pinching map Z have different
forms, as we will present shortly. In principle, we can
use additional information about second moments like
〈qˆpˆ〉 to constrain ρAB as the information becomes avail-
able via the heterodyne detection. However, our calcula-
tion shows that additional constraints like this can only
provide marginal improvements on the key rates in our
simulated scenarios. We expect these constraints will be
more useful if we introduce squeezing in either the pro-
tocol or the simulation.
For an input state ρ, the heterodyne detection gives
us the Husimi Q function Q(γ) = 1pi 〈γ| ρ |γ〉 = Tr(ρEγ),
where {Eγ = 1pi |γ〉〈γ| : γ ∈ C} is the POVM description
of the heterodyne measurement. Then from the Q func-
tion, we can also obtain values of 〈qˆ〉, 〈pˆ〉, 〈nˆ〉, 〈dˆ〉, whose
operators are functions of aˆ, aˆ†, by the following equation
[33]
Tr
[
ρfˆ(aˆ, aˆ†)
]
= 〈fˆ (A)(aˆ, aˆ†)〉 :=
∫
d2γQ(γ)f (A)(γ),
(19)
where fˆ (A)(aˆ, aˆ†) is the anti-normal ordered operator of
an operator fˆ written in terms of aˆ, aˆ†, f (A)(γ) is the
corresponding expression by replacing aˆ by γ and aˆ† by
γ∗, and d2γ = dRe(γ)d Im(γ).
To write out the Kraus operator for the postprocessing
map G including postselection, we define region operators
that tell us in which region in Fig. 1 that Bob’s mea-
surement outcome lies. We express them using the polar
coordinate for the integration as
R0 =
1
π
∫ ∞
∆a
∫ pi
4−∆p
−pi4+∆p
γ
∣∣γeiθ〉〈γeiθ∣∣ dθ dγ,
R1 =
1
π
∫ ∞
∆a
∫ 3pi
4 −∆p
pi
4+∆p
γ
∣∣γeiθ〉〈γeiθ∣∣ dθ dγ,
R2 =
1
π
∫ ∞
∆a
∫ 5pi
4 −∆p
3pi
4 +∆p
γ
∣∣γeiθ〉〈γeiθ∣∣ dθ dγ,
R3 =
1
π
∫ ∞
∆a
∫ 7pi
4 −∆p
5pi
4 +∆p
γ
∣∣γeiθ〉〈γeiθ∣∣ dθ dγ.
(20)
8The area of integration for each operator corresponds to
the relevant region shown in Fig. 1. Again, ∆a and ∆p
are parameters related to postselection.
In this case, the postprocessing map G(σ) = KσK† is
given by the Kraus operator
K =
3∑
z=0
|z〉R ⊗ 1A ⊗ (
√
Rz)B. (21)
The pinching quantum channel Z is given by the projec-
tions Zj = |j〉〈j|R ⊗ 1AB for j = 0, 1, 2, 3, that is, for a
valid input state σ,
Z(σ) =
3∑
j=0
(|j〉〈j|R ⊗ 1AB)σ(|j〉〈j|R ⊗ 1AB). (22)
Like protocol 1, we have made a simplification for the
Kraus operator K by a similar line of argument.
E. Generalization to other discrete modulation
schemes beyond four coherent states
From the description of our security proof method, we
remark that this proof technique does not depend on the
distribution of the statistics, whether it is Gaussian or
not. This is unlike the analytical results presented in
Refs. [13, 14]. Also, it is not difficult to see that our
method can be generalized to analyze discrete-modulated
CV-QKD protocols with more coherent states. If Alice
modulates using ℓ coherent states, then Alice’s system
A is ℓ−dimensional from the source-replacement scheme.
In this case, the corresponding optimization problem es-
sentially has the same form as in Eq. (16) except that
the index x now runs from 0 to ℓ−1 and the maps G and
Z need to be modified accordingly to match the descrip-
tion of the protocol in a straightforward way. A guide
to defining the postprocessing map G is also provided in
Appendix A.
IV. SIMULATION AND KEY RATE
In this section, we first discuss our model for simu-
lating experiments that execute each protocol. From the
simulation, we can obtain relevant expectation values like
〈qˆ〉, 〈pˆ〉 that we usually would obtain from an actual ex-
periment and which are the starting point of our key rate
optimization problem as in Eq. (16). Then we comment
on the numerical performance of our current algorithm
and discuss relevant numerical issues. Finally, we present
key rates for both protocols with different variations. We
emphasize that our security proof technique of course
does not depend on the model of experiment that we use
to predict the experimental behavior.
A. Simulation model
To understand how the protocols behave in a realistic
scenario, we simulate the quantum channel as a realistic
physical channel in the absence of Eve. Such a chan-
nel in the context of optical fiber communication can
be described by a phase-invariant Gaussian channel with
transmittance η and excess noise ξ which is defined as
ξ =
(∆qobs)
2
(∆qvac)2
− 1, (23)
where (∆qvac)
2 is the variance of q quadrature for the
vacuum state and (∆qobs)
2 is the variance of q quadra-
ture observed for the signal state. Here we consider the
case where both q and p quadratures have the same
variance. With our definition of quadrature operators,
(∆qvac)
2 = 12 . In the literature, the value of excess noise
is usually reported in a couple of different ways, depend-
ing on who makes the observation of (∆qobs)
2. To avoid
possible confusions when discussing the value of excess
noise, we clarify these definitions. We use ξ to mean the
excess noise in the case where Alice measures (∆qobs)
2
at the output of her lab and use δ in the case where Bob
measures (∆qobs)
2 for the received signal state.
A natural way to simulate this phase-invariant Gaus-
sian channel is that when Alice prepares a coherent state
|α〉 and sends to Bob via this channel, the output state
becomes a displaced thermal state centered at
√
ηα with
the variance 12 (1+δ) for each quadrature. An alternative
but equivalent way is that when Alice wants to prepare
a coherent state |α〉, the state after preparation becomes
a displaced thermal state centered at α with the vari-
ance 12 (1 + ξ) for each quadrature at the output of her
lab. Then the state is transmitted via a pure-loss channel
and the final output state that reaches Bob’s lab is a dis-
placed thermal state centered at
√
ηα with the variance
1
2 (1+ ηξ) for each quadrature. Therefore, we see that for
this physical channel, δ = ηξ. In this work, we use the
definition of ξ when we discuss the value of excess noise.
Readers should be able to translate between these two
definitions by the relation δ = ηξ.
Given a displaced thermal state centered at
√
ηα with
the variance 12 (1 + ηξ) for each quadrature, we can then
calculate our simulated values for 〈qˆ〉, 〈pˆ〉, 〈nˆ〉 and 〈dˆ〉
(by either using quasiprobability distribution like Wigner
function or Q function of the final state or expanding the
final state in the photon number basis). These values can
then be supplied to the optimization problem in Eq. (16)
which in turn can be solved numerically.
B. About numerical algorithm and performance
To perform the numerical calculation of secret key
rates, we apply the two-step procedure mentioned in Ref.
[22]. At the first step, we adopt the Frank-Wolfe algo-
rithm [34] to find a sub-optimal attack that gives rise to
9a sub-optimal bipartite state ρAB. At the second step,
we use this sub-optimal ρAB to solve a linear SDP prob-
lem to obtain a reliable lower bound on the key rate,
which also takes the constraint violation into considera-
tion. The Frank-Wolfe algorithm used in the first step is
an iterative first-order optimization algorithm. We start
with an initial choice of ρAB in the feasible set S and in
each iteration, we solve a linear SDP problem to update
the choice of ρAB until a stopping criterion is satisfied.
Since this optimization algorithm may have a very slow
rate of convergence near the optimal point in some sce-
narios, in order to have a reasonable running time, we
limit the maximum number of Frank-Wolfe iterations to
be 300. To solve linear SDP problems in both first and
second steps, we employ the CVX package [35, 36] and
SDPT3 [37, 38] solver in MATLAB.
In Fig. 2, we plot the results of the first step and the
second step for the protocols 1 and 2 in the case of pure-
loss channel (ξ = 0) which will be discussed in details in
Sec. IVC. Here we ultilize this figure to illustrate some
apsects of the numerical analysis. The result from the
first step can be treated as an approximate upper bound
since it is given by a sub-optimal ρAB. (It is only approx-
imate because the feasible set S might be enlarged either
due to the coarse-graining of constraints or due to the
numerical constraint violation.) The result of the second
step is a reliable lower bound on the key rate. There are
three regions in each plot. Since both plots have similar
numerical behaviors, we take Fig. 2a as an example to
discuss these three regions. The first region is where both
steps give essentially the same results, as we can see for
points between 0 km to around 120 km. The second re-
gion is between around 120 km to 150 km where there is
a noticeable gap between our approximate upper bound
and reliable lower bound. This gap is an indicator that
the first step algorithm fails to find a good sub-optimal
ρAB. In fact, the chosen number of maximum iterations
for the first-step Frank-Wolfe algorithm is reached for
those points. The third region is beyond 150 km where
the lower bound is missing in the plot. This is because
the sub-optimal ρAB from the first step also has some
noticeable constraint violation when the first step ter-
minates prematurely after 300 iterations. Since we take
constraint violations into account in the second step cal-
culation to obtain a reliable lower bound according to
Ref. [22], these points correspond to the case where the
lower bound obtained is zero. To obtain a better lower
bound, one needs to improve the result of the first step
calculation. There are several possible ways to improve
the first step result:
i) replacing the Frank-Wolfe algorithm by other optimiza-
tion algorithms;
ii) using a different SDP solver;
iii) choosing a different initial point (ρAB) for the first step;
iv) increasing the number of iterations.
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FIG. 2. The key rate versus the transmission distance in the
case of pure-loss channel to demonstrate the numerical behav-
ior of the two-step key rate calculation procedure and to com-
pare with the direct evaluation of Devetak-Winter formula
(analytical results) for both protocols. The transmittance is
modeled as η = 10−0.02L for each distance L in km and the
reconciliation efficiency is β = 0.95. The curve with circle
marker is the approximate upper bound from the first step
and the curve with star marker is the reliable lower bound ob-
tained from the second step. The curve with square marker is
the result of direct evaluation via the analytical formula pre-
sented in Appendix C without numerical optimization. (a)
The key rate for protocol 1 (homodyne detection). The co-
herent state amplitude α is optimized via a coarse search in
the interval [0.36, 0.6]. (b) The key rate for protocol 2 (hetero-
dyne detection). The coherent state amplitude α is optimized
via a coarse search in the interval [0.6, 0.95].
The main reason behind these alternatives is that dif-
ferent solvers and different algorithms can have different
rates of convergence and thus can potentially give better
results within the time limit. Since the aim of this work
is not about optimizing the numerical optimization algo-
rithm, we choose to report results based on our current
choice of algorithm and solver mentioned before with the
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limitation of 300 iterations in the first step and we will
see that such a choice works well in many scenarios.
For all the remaining figures in this work, we only
report the reliable lower bound obtained from the sec-
ond step. For some of the curves shown in this work,
even though there are data points from the second and
third scenarios mentioned above, which are not compat-
ible with the general trend of the curve, these numbers
can still be safely interpreted as reliable (but very pes-
simistic) secret key rates. We may expect that if we im-
prove the optimization algorithm (which is not the goal
of this work), we can obtain smoother curves. It is also
interesting to point out that when we add some nonzero
excess noise, the curves that we obtain (shown in later
sections) can be smoother than the loss-only curves. We
can understand this behavior from the fact that the rank
of the density matrix ρAB is much smaller than its di-
mension for the loss-only case and thus the problem is
not numerically well-conditioned. One can improve on
this aspect if one can reformulate the problem using a
lower-dimensional representation.
C. Loss-only scenario: comparison to analytical
results
We first present the results for the loss-only scenario,
that is, ξ = 0. For this scenario, we can also obtain
an analytical result to have a direct comparison with
our numerical result. A direct evaluation of Devetak-
Winter formula is possible in this scenario since we can
determine relevant Eve’s conditional states (up to irrel-
evant unitaries). As shown in Ref. [20], in the loss-only
case, we only need to consider the generalized beam-
splitting attack. When Alice sends |αx〉A′ to Bob, the
state becomes
∣∣√ηαx〉B ∣∣√1− ηαx〉E after the pure-loss
channel. Eve’s conditional states conditioned on Alice’s
string value x and Bob’s raw key string value z effectively
live in a two-dimensional subspace for protocol 1 and a
four-dimensional subspace for protocol 2. This makes
the direct analytical evaluation possible. We leave the
procedure of this analytical evaluation to Appendix C.
For the numerical key rate optimization, the loss-only
scenario follows as a special case of the noisy scenario
(using ξ = 0) which we discuss in the later sections.
A pure-loss channel is characterized by its transmit-
tance η = 10−
αattL
10 for each distance L in km with the
attenuation coefficient αatt, which is 0.2 dB/km for the
relevant communication fiber. One may take the quan-
tum efficiency of realistic homodyne/heterodyne detec-
tors into account. A simple but pessimistic way to deal
with the detector efficiency is that the loss due to the
imperfect detector is also attributed to Eve. In such
a worse-case scenario, we can define the total transmit-
tance as η = ηdet10
−0.02L, where ηdet is the quantum effi-
ciency of the detectors. If one defines an effective distance
L0 for the detector inefficiency, that is, ηdet = 10
−0.02L0,
then L0 is less than 13 km for practical homodyne and
heterodyne detectors with the quantum efficiency ≥ 55%
[39]. For the ease of presentation and convenience of com-
parison with other works using different values of detector
efficiency, we set ηdet = 1 in this work unless noted oth-
erwise. One may obtain the key rate value corresponding
to a realistic value of efficiency by subtracting the effec-
tive distance L0 from all relevant figures.
We plot the key rate versus transmission distance in
the loss-only scenario for protocol 1 in Fig. 2a and
for protocol 2 in Fig. 2b. For both protocols, we plot
both the numerical key rate calculation results and the
key rate that can be obtained by a direct evaluation of
Devetak-Winter formula. Interestingly, we see that our
numerical results are close to the analytical results for
both protocols up to the distance around 120 km. Above
120 km, we notice there is a visible gap between our ap-
proximate upper bound and reliable lower bound, which
indicates there is a room for improvements on the nu-
merical algorithm. We also notice our first step result
is slightly lower than the analytical result. The reason
is that by analytical analysis, we know the feasible set
S effectively should contain only one state (up to irrel-
evant unitaries from the perspective of entropy evalu-
ation). However, we use coarse-grained constraints in
our numerical optimization and thus the feasible set S
is actually enlarged. We expect that if all fine-grained
constraints are used, we should be able to reproduce the
analytical results in this loss-only scenario (when a better
optimization algorithm is used).
D. Noisy scenario: protocol 1
1. Simulated statistics and error correction cost
We now consider the noisy scenario with nonzero ex-
cess noise ξ. From the homodyne measurement, for each
αx ∈ {α,−α, iα,−iα}, the simulated statistics is given
as
〈qˆ〉x =
√
2ηRe(αx),
〈pˆ〉x =
√
2η Im(αx),
〈nˆ〉x = η|αx|2 + ηξ
2
,
〈dˆ〉x = η(α2x + (α∗x)2).
(24)
With these values specified, we perform the optimization
to bound Eve’s information.
Since we simulate the experimental behavior and the
cost of error correction is not a part of the optimization,
we now present the analytical formula to estimate δEC
from the simulated statistics and numerically evaluate
the formula. In this protocol, we only use |+α〉 , |−α〉
(α ∈ R) and the q quadrature measurement to gener-
ate keys. After Bob performs his key map, Alice and
Bob effectively communicate via a binary channel for the
purpose of error correction. From the simulation, the
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probability distributions of Bob’s q quadrature measure-
ment outcomes for conditional states ρ0B and ρ
1
B are
P (q|0) = 1√
π(ηξ + 1)
e
−(q−√2ηα)2
ηξ+1 ,
P (q|1) = 1√
π(ηξ + 1)
e
−(q+√2ηα)2
ηξ+1 .
(25)
Since we allow postselection with the cutoff parameter
∆c, the sifting probability reads
ppass =
1
2
(
1−
∫ ∆c
−∆c
P (q|0)dq
)
+
1
2
(
1−
∫ ∆c
−∆c
P (q|1)dq
)
= 1− 1
2
∫ ∆c
−∆c
P (q|0)dq − 1
2
∫ ∆c
−∆c
P (q|1)dq.
(26)
The error probability between Alice’s and Bob’s strings
is
e =
1
ppass
(1
2
∫ −∆c
−∞
P (q|0)dq + 1
2
∫ ∞
∆c
P (q|1)dq
)
. (27)
For the error correction performed at the Shannon
limit, we have δEC = H(Z|X) = h(e), where h(x) =
−x log2(x)−(1−x) log2(1−x) is the binary entropy func-
tion. To take into account of the inefficiency of error cor-
rection, we first write δEC = H(Z|X) = H(Z) − I(X;Z)
in terms of I(X;Z) and then scale I(X;Z) to be βI(X;Z)
where β is the reconciliation efficiency whose value is usu-
ally reported in CV-QKD literature. Therefore,
δEC = H(Z)− βI(X;Z)
= (1− β)H(Z) + βH(Z|X)
= (1− β)H(Z) + βh(e).
(28)
In this work, we use β = 0.95 in all figures unless
mentioned otherwise.
2. Key rates for protocol 1
We first investigate the optimal choice of coherent state
amplitude α in the absence of postselection, that is,
∆c = 0. In Fig. 3, we plot the key rate versus the choice
of α for a selected set of distances in the case of the excess
noise ξ = 0.01. The optimal choice of α for each distance
L = 20, 50, 80, 100 km lies around 0.4, corresponding to
a mean photon number of 0.16 from Alice’s source. We
also see that the optimal choice does not change signifi-
cantly for different distances. This observation allows us
to search in a restricted interval when we optimize α to
maximize the key rate for each transmission distance.
In Fig. 4, we show the secret key rates as a function
of the transmission distance for the protocol 1 with ho-
modyne detection for different choices of excess noise ξ.
For this plot, we optimize the coherent state amplitude
α by a coarse search in the interval [0.35, 0.6]. As we can
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FIG. 3. Secure key rate for protocol 1 versus coherent state
amplitude α for a selected choices of distance L. Other pa-
rameters: excess noise ξ = 0.01 and reconciliation efficiency
β = 0.95.
see from the plot, we can reach around 200 km with ex-
perimentally feasible value of excess noise, say, ξ = 0.01
[39, 40] with the current technology before the key rate
becomes insignificant (say less than 10−6 per pulse). To
put the number in a more concrete and realistic context,
if we consider a system with the repetition rate of 1 GHz
and with the detector efficiency 55%, we can obtain 103
bits per second at the distance of around 170 km if the
total excess noise ξ can be made to be 1% or less.
We also investigate the effects of postselection. The
idea of postselection was initially introduced to CV-QKD
protocols in order to beat 3 dB limit [18]. The key rate
can be potentially improved by discarding very noisy
data where Eve has more advantages in determining the
raw key than the party (Bob in the case of direct reconcil-
iation and Alice in the case of reverse reconciliation) who
needs to match the raw key via the error correction. In-
tuitively, if we optimize the postselection parameter ∆c,
the key rate can never be lower than the protocol with-
out postselection since one can always set ∆c = 0 if it is
optimal to do so. The important observation here is that
our security proof technique allows us to consider postse-
lection with ∆c > 0 by a simple modification of the post-
processing map G, unlike previous security proofs based
on Gaussian optimality. In Fig. 5, we take the case with
excess noise ξ = 0.02 and the coherent state amplitude
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FIG. 4. Secure key rate versus distance for the protocol 1
with homodyne measurement for different values of the excess
noise, from top to bottom, ξ = 0.002, 0.005, 0.01, 0.015, 0.02.
The coherent state amplitude is optimized via a coarse search
in the range [0.35, 0.6], the transmittance is η = 10−0.02L
for each distance L in km and the reconciliation efficiency is
β = 0.95. (See Sec. IVB for an explanation for the non-
smoothness of curves.)
α = 0.45 as an example to illustrate how the postse-
lection strategy can improve the key rate in the reverse
reconciliation scheme and to which extent it can help.
We first search an optimal value for the postselection pa-
rameter ∆c by a coarse search and we see in Fig. 5a, the
optimal value is around 0.6 at the distance L = 20 km.
We have also obtained similar plots for different choices
of distance and found the optimal value falls roughly in
the interval [0.5, 0.7]. In Fig. 5b, we compare the key
rate with postselection (∆C > 0) to that without postse-
lection (∆c = 0) for two values of reconciliation efficiency
β. In this plot, we optimize the postselection parameter
∆c via a coarse search in the interval [0.5, 0.7]. Since the
curves with postselection are above the curves without
postselection, we see that the postselection strategy can
improve the key rates. We also notice that for reverse rec-
onciliation schemes, the advantage of postselection also
depends on the reconciliation efficiency β. The gap be-
tween these two scenarios ∆c = 0 and ∆c > 0 is smaller
when more efficient code (larger β) is used.
E. Noisy scenario: protocol 2
1. Simulated statistics and error correction cost
We now investigate the protocol 2 which uses the het-
erodyne detection. From the heterodyne measurement,
for each conditional state ρxB with αx ∈ {α, iα,−α,−iα},
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FIG. 5. Secure key rate for the protocol 1 (homodyne detec-
tion) with postselection. The excess noise is ξ = 0.02 and
the coherent state amplitude is α = 0.45. (a) Secure key rate
versus the postselection parameter ∆c at the distance L = 20
km. The reconciliation efficiency is β = 0.95. (b) Secure key
rate versus the transmission distance with or without post-
selection for two different values of reconciliation efficiency
β. Solid lines have the reconciliation efficiency β = 0.95 and
dashed lines have the reconciliation efficiency β = 0.9. Lines
with (red) circle markers have ∆c = 0 and lines with (black)
triangle markers have ∆c optimized via a coarse search in the
interval [0.5, 0.7]. Missing points for the curves reflect that
the key rates drop to zero.
we obtain a Q function Qx as
Qx(γ) =
1
π(1 + ηξ/2)
exp
(
−
∣∣γ −√ηαx∣∣2
1 + ηξ/2
)
. (29)
From each Q function, we can then calculate
〈qˆ〉x = 1√
2
∫
(γ + γ∗)Qx(γ)d2γ =
√
2ηRe(αx),
〈pˆ〉x = i√
2
∫
(γ∗ − γ)Qx(γ)d2γ =
√
2η Im(αx),
〈nˆ〉x =
∫
(|γ|2 − 1)Qx(γ)d2γ = η|αx|2 + ηξ
2
,
〈dˆ〉x =
∫
(γ2 + (γ∗)2)Qx(γ)d2γ = η(α2x + (α
∗
x)
2).
(30)
Note those values are exactly the same as from the ho-
modyne measurements since we have the same state after
the simulated quantum channel. We obtain those values
here indirectly via the Q function.
We also present the procedure to calculate δEC for pro-
tocol 2. We can numerically evaluate H(Z|X) via the
probability distribution:
P (z = j|x = k) = Tr(RjρkB)
=
∫ ∞
∆a
∫ 2j+1
4pi −∆p
2j−1
4pi +∆p
exp
(
−|γe
iθ−√ηαk|2
1+ηξ/2
)
π(1 + ηξ/2)
γ dθ dγ,
(31)
where j, k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, Rj ’s are the region operators de-
fined in Eq. (20) and the conditional state ρkB is defined
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in Eq. (8). (In the case of postselection, we then renor-
malize this probability distribution by the probability of
being postselected.) Then δEC can be calculated by the
second line of Eq. (28) as we now take into account that
we have an alphabet of four symbols on both sides in the
error correction step.
2. Key rates for protocol 2
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FIG. 6. Secure key rate for protocol 2 versus coherent state
amplitude α for selected distances L. Other parameters: ex-
cess noise ξ = 0.01 and reconciliation efficiency β = 0.95.
As with the case of protocol 1, we start by investi-
gating the optimal choice of coherent state amplitude α
for protocol 2. In Fig. 6, we plot the key rates ver-
sus α for selected distances when the excess noise ξ is
0.01. Comparing to Fig. 3, we see that the optimal α
for this variant with heterodyne detection is in general
larger than that for protocol 1. The optimal choice of
α in the protocol 2 is around 0.7 for those selected dis-
tances, corresponding to a mean photon number around
0.49, while the optimal choice of α in the protocol 1 is
around 0.4 for those selected distances, corresponding to
a mean photon number around 0.16. Like the protocol
1, we observe that the optimal value of α for the pro-
tocol 2 does not change significantly for a wide range of
distances. From the observation here, we later limit our
search for optimal choice of α in a restricted interval.
In Fig. 7, we plot the secure key rate versus the trans-
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FIG. 7. Secure key rate versus the transmission distance
for the protocol 2 with heterodyne detection for different
values of the excess noise ξ, from top to bottom, ξ =
0.002, 0.005, 0.01, 0.015, 0.02, 0.03, 0.04. The coherent state
amplitude is optimized via a coarse search over the interval
[0.6, 0.92], the transmittance is η = 10−0.02L for each distance
L in km and the reconciliation efficiency is β = 0.95.
mission distance for different values of excess noise ξ.
We optimize the coherent state amplitude α via a coarse
search over the interval [0.6, 0.92]. Interestingly, we see
that the key rate for protocol 2 is much higher than pro-
tocol 1 when the excess noise is large. For a direct com-
parison, we replot key rates of both protocols for the
values of excess noise ξ = 0.01 and 0.02 from Figs. 4
and 7 in Fig. 8. We observe that the protocol 2 achieves
much higher key rates and reaches longer distances than
the protocol 1 for the same amount of excess noise. In
this figure, we also plot the key rate of protocol 2 with
the excess noise ξ = 0.04 for a direct comparison to the
key rate of protocol 1 with the excess noise ξ = 0.02. We
see that the protocol 2 behaves similarly as the protocol
1 with half of the excess noise for those values of excess
noise considered here.
We then compare our results with the security anal-
ysis in Ref. [17] for a similar protocol. We differ from
that protocol by how the error correction is done, which
affects the calculation of the error correction cost term
δEC. In particular, our error correction cost is higher be-
cause we discretize Bob’s measurement results and only
consider binary or quaternary error correcting codes. In
Ref. [17], the mutual information I(X;Z) is obtained by
the channel capacity of binary additive white Gaussian
noise channel, which is approximated by the capacity of
an additive white Gaussian noise channel
I(X;Z) ≈ log2
(
1 +
2ηα2
2 + ηξ
)
. (32)
This leads to a smaller value of δEC by the conversion
formula in the first line of Eq. (28). In Fig. 9, we
plot the key rate results from both our work and Ref.
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FIG. 8. Secure key rate versus transmission distance for a
direct comparison between protocol 1 and protocol 2. Curves
for protocol 1 are from Fig. 4 and plotted with triangle mark-
ers; the excess noise is ξ = 0.01, 0.02 from top to bottom for
curves with triangle markers. Curves for protocol 2 are from
Fig. 7 and plotted with circle markers; the excess noise is
ξ = 0.01, 0.02, 0.04 from top to bottom for curves with circle
markers.
[17] with a fixed choice of the coherent state amplitude
α = 0.35 for all distances plotted and with two different
values of excess noise. As we can see, our security proof
approach provides a remarkable improvement compared
with the approach with a reduction to the Gaussian op-
timality. Our security analysis shows that this protocol
has a good tolerance on the excess noise and can extend
to significantly longer distances. We emphasize that this
choice of α = 0.35 is not optimal for both works. While
this value is closer to the optimal value found in Ref. [17],
the optimal value of the coherent state amplitude found
in our work is around 0.7 (for ξ = 0.01) as mentioned be-
fore. Thus, we also include two curves from Fig. 7 where
the coherent state amplitude α is optimized via a coarse
search in the interval [0.6,0.92] for comparisons. As we
can see from Fig. 9, the key rate can be significantly im-
proved after we optimize α. We summarize two factors
that can boost the key rates. First, our security proof
technique gives a tighter estimation of Eve’s information
compared with the reduction to the Gaussian optimality
approach. Second, the key rate can be improved by using
a slightly larger value of α than what has been previously
investigated. This regime of α was not explored previ-
ously because the reduction to the Gaussian optimality
approach for discrete modulation schemes gives tight key
rates only in the limit of α→ 0 and can give quite loose
key rates for large values of α.
Finally, we present the results on the effects of postse-
lection. Our coarse search for values of ∆p suggests that
the optimal value is ∆p = 0, that is, we do not postse-
lect the data based on the phase. For the postselection
parameter ∆a related to the amplitude of the measured
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FIG. 9. A comparison of key rates between our work and
Ref. [17] for two values of excess noise ξ = 0.005, 0.01 and
a comparison of key rates between a non-optimal choice of
coherent state amplitude α and the optimal choice. Curves
with circle and star markers are from this work. Curves with
triangle markers are from Ref. [17]. The bottom four curves
use a fixed (not optimal) coherent state amplitude α = 0.35
and the top two curves optimize the coherent state amplitude.
All curves use the reconciliation efficiency β = 0.95.
complex value from the heterodyne detection, we then
perform a coarse search for its optimal value. In Fig. 10,
we consider the scenarios with the excess noise ξ = 0.04.
and with a fixed coherent state amplitude α = 0.6 as an
example. In Fig. 10a, we plot the key rate versus this pa-
rameter ∆a at the distance L = 20 km with the reconcili-
ation efficiency β = 0.95. From this plot, we observe that
the optimal value of ∆a is around 0.6 at this distance.
We have also obtained similar plots for various choices of
distance and found that the optimal value roughly falls
in the interval [0.4,0.7]. In Fig. 10b, we compare key
rates with or without postselection for two different val-
ues of reconciliation efficiency at different transmission
distances and for this plot, we optimize the values of ∆a
via a coarse search in the interval [0.4,0.7]. We again no-
tice that postselection with reverse reconciliation can im-
prove the key rates. We remark the improvement due to
postselection in the reverse reconciliation scheme is more
visible for less efficient error-correcting codes, larger ex-
cess noise and longer transmission distances. This agrees
with the observation made in Ref. [20] under a restricted
class of attacks.
V. SUMMARY & OUTLOOK
By numerically solving the key rate optimization prob-
lem, we obtain the asymptotic key rates against collective
attacks for discrete-modulated CV-QKD protocols with
four coherent states and with homodyne or heterodyne
detections. We observe that CV-QKD with quadrature
phase-shift keying modulation and reverse reconciliation
15
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FIG. 10. Secure key rate for the protocol 2 (heterodyne de-
tection) with postselection. The excess noise is ξ = 0.04, the
coherent state amplitude is α = 0.6 and one of postselec-
tion parameters is ∆p = 0. (a) Secure key rate versus the
postselection parameter ∆a at the distance L = 20 km. The
reconciliation efficiency is β = 0.95. (b) Secure key rate ver-
sus the transmission distance with or without postselection
for two different values of reconciliation efficiency β. Solid
lines have β = 0.95 and dashed lines have β = 0.9. Lines
with (red) circle markers have ∆a = 0 and lines with (black)
triangle markers have ∆a optimized via a coarse search in the
interval [0.4, 0.7]. Missing points for the curves reflect that
the key rates drop to zero.
can significantly improve the key rate compared with pre-
vious binary and ternary modulation schemes [13, 14].
Also from the comparison with the results in Ref. [17],
we see that our work significantly improves the key rates.
Since our security proof approach can give tight key rates,
we also see that our key rates can be higher than the
one with a linear bosonic channel assumption [15] as the
analysis in Ref. [15] is not known be tight. Thus, our
results show that this protocol can achieve comparable
key rates as Gaussian modulation schemes. In addition,
we consider the effects of postselection and demonstrate
that postselection can improve the key rates. Our secu-
rity analysis imposes a photon number cutoff assumption
which truncates the total dimension of system by ignor-
ing the subspace that has negligible contributions. There
are multiple paths to remove the photon number cutoff
assumption: we either generalize the idea of squashing
model to CV protocols, or analytically bound the error
due to the photon number cutoff to obtain a key rate
lower bound. Finally, one needs to generalize the proof
against collective attacks in the asymptotic regime to a
composable security proof including finite-size effects us-
ing techniques like exponential de Finetti theorem [31].
We also want to point out that key rates of both pro-
tocols can be further improved by a better choice of key
map and the error correction strategy. In both protocols,
we discretize Bob’s measurement outcomes to obtain bi-
nary or quaternary strings. Therefore, we only consider
binary or quaternary error-correcting codes. For a better
choice of key map, we may run the optimization in Eq.
(16) with modified G and Z maps.
Finally, we comment on how to deal with imperfect
detectors. We currently treat detectors as perfect detec-
tors. We can obtain key rates with imperfect detectors
by a simple but pessimistic treatment, that is, additional
loss and additional excess noise due to imperfect detec-
tors are attributed to Eve. By doing so, we can simply
modify two parameters η and ξ to obtain key rates related
to imperfect detectors. One may improve the key rates
by not giving Eve this additional power and by modeling
the imperfection in the POVM description of detectors.
We leave further improvements to the future work.
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Appendix A: Framework for postprocessing -
derivation and simplification
In this appendix, we present the derivation of the gen-
eral postprocessing framework in Ref. [22] and then make
several observations to simplify the postprocessing map
G in special cases, which leads to a reduction of the di-
mensions required in the numerical analysis. Finally, we
remark how G maps are simplified in this work.
We make some definitions to set up the notations.
When we write an operator on composite registers, we
omit the identity operator on the unspecified registers
and may reorder registers for the ease of writing. More-
over, the relevant unspecified registers depend on the
context. Let X denote the set of Alice’s measurement
outcomes. By Alice’s announcements SA, we partition
the set X into subsets Xa for a ∈ SA such that X =⋃
a∈SA Xa. Similarly, we partition Bob’s measurement
outcomes Y as Y = ⋃b∈SB Yb by his announcements SB.
To simplify our notation, we assume without loss of gen-
erality that |Xa| = ωA for all a ∈ SA and |Yb| = ωB for
all b ∈ SB for some numbers ωA and ωB independent of
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FIG. 11. (a) A schematic circuit diagram for the relevant
postprocessing steps: announcement, sifting and key map.
Three dashed boxes separate Alice, Bob and Eve’s domains.
The initial pure state ρABE is evolved by an isometry at each
step which introduces additional registers and applies a uni-
tary operation on relevant registers. UAAM, U
B
AM, US and UK
are unitary operations related to announcement & measure-
ment, sifting and key map. (b) An explanation for the con-
trolled unitary operation used in (a). Here, m, r, n are some
sufficiently large integers so that we have a representation of
the basis elements for each register in the computational basis
of qubits. See text in Appendix A for more explanations.
a and b. This can be easily satisfied by a clever way of
book-keeping measurement outcomes. Then, we define
a family of maps fa : Ω
A := {1, 2, . . . , ωA} → Xa and a
family of maps fb : Ω
B := {1, 2, . . . , ωB} → Yb. Both fa’s
and fb’s are bijective. Finally, we label Alice’s POVM P
A
as PA := {PAx : x ∈ X} = {PA(a,fa(α)) : a ∈ SA, α ∈ ΩA}
and Bob’s POVM PB := {PBy : y ∈ Y} = {PB(b,fb(β)) :
b ∈ SB, β ∈ ΩB}.
1. A full model for the relevant postprocessing
steps
We give a schematic circuit diagram in Fig. 11 to de-
scribe the announcement (including measurement), sift-
ing and key map steps. This diagram covers the scenarios
related to this work and it works for protocols with one
round of announcements and with reverse reconciliation.
It is not difficult to draw a similar diagram in other sce-
narios, including the direct reconciliation schemes. Un-
der collective attacks, Alice and Bob share a bipartite
quantum state ρAB after each transmission of quantum
signal. In the worst-case scenario, Eve holds a purifica-
tion ρABE of ρAB. The initial state in the circuit dia-
gram is ρABE . At each step, the state is evolved by an
isometry, that is, we introduce some local registers and
evolve the state by a local unitary. We also keep track of
the information leakage during the classical communica-
tion. If some information is publicly available during the
classical communication in the protocol, then each party
holds a copy of the relevant registers. One can recover
the classical communication information by measuring a
local copy of these registers in the computational basis.
Now, we discuss each of the three steps in details.
The isometries related to the announcement and mea-
surement step are denoted by WA for Alice and WB
for Bob. In particular, WA first introduces two regis-
ters A˜ and A, and then applies a unitary operator UAAM
to implement Alice’s POVM PA in a coherent fashion,
where announcements are stored in the register A˜ and
measurement outcomes are in the register A. Like Al-
ice’s isometry WA, Bob’s isometry WB implements his
POVM PB with the announcement register B˜ and mea-
surement outcome register B using a local unitary UBAM.
Since the announcement information is available to ev-
eryone, Eve obtains a copy (denoted by EA˜) of A˜ and
a copy (denoted by EB˜) of B˜. The coherent version
of copying is represented by the controlled NOT op-
eration. Also, Alice and Bob each has a copy of the
other party’s announcement register, denoted by B˜copy
and A˜copy respectively. For the convenience of writ-
ing, we use A˜ and B˜ to refer to both Alice’s and Bob’s
copies of A˜ and B˜. As we will see later, we can actu-
ally combine the register A˜ with A˜copy and combine B˜
with B˜copy in the key rate calculation. In this diagram,
the state after the announcement and measurement step
is ρ
(1)
[A][B]EE
A˜
E
B˜
= (WA ⊗WB)ρABE(WA ⊗WB)†, where
for the ease of writing, we reorder the registers and use
a shorthand notation for collections of registers: [A] for
registers AA˜A and [B] for registers BB˜B.
The sifting step partitions the set of announcement
events SA × SB as SA × SB = K ∪D, where K is the
set of announcement events to be kept and D is the set
of announcements to be discarded. The sifting isometry
(denoted by VS) introduces a register S to store the re-
sult of sifting (keep or discard) and performs a unitary
operator US on the local copies of registers A˜ and B˜ to
compute the sifting decision. In a common scenario, each
party can implement this unitary US from the description
of a protocol. If it is not from the protocol description
and additional classical communication is needed, then
after a party implements this unitary operation, other
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parties obtain a copy of the register S. For simplicity,
we use S to refer to both Alice’s and Bob’s copies of this
register. In the diagram, the state after this sifting step
is ρ
(2)
[A][B]S[E] = VSρ
(1)
[A][B]EE
A˜
E
B˜
V †S , where we use a short-
hand notation [E] to refer to Eve’s collection of registers
EEA˜EB˜ES .
The key map isometry VK introduces a register R and
applies a local unitary UK to compute the key map g
and to store the result in the register R. This key map
g takes the announcement (a, b) ∈ SA × SB and Alice’s
measurement outcome fa(α) in the case of direct rec-
onciliation or Bob’s measurement outcome fb(β) in the
case of reverse reconciliation as inputs, and outputs a
value in {0, 1, . . . , N − 1} where N is the number of key
symbols. For the purpose of derivation, we include an
additional key symbol ⊥ to this set and map all dis-
carded events to it. We will see later that we can even-
tually remove the symbol ⊥ from the set of key sym-
bols. In the diagram, the state after the key map state
is ρ
(3)
R[A][B]S[E] = VKρ
(2)
[A][B]S[E]V
†
K .
To give explicit expressions for these isometries WA,
WB , VS and VK , we first define K
A
a and K
B
b as
KAa =
∑
α∈ΩA
√
PA(a,fa(α)) ⊗ |a〉A˜ ⊗ |α〉A ,
KBb =
∑
β∈ΩB
√
PB(b,fb(β)) ⊗ |b〉B˜ ⊗ |β〉B ,
(A1)
where {|a〉 : a ∈ SA} and {|b〉 : b ∈ SB} are or-
thonormal bases for registers A˜ (EA˜) and B˜ (EB˜), and
{|α〉 : α ∈ ΩA} and {|β〉 : β ∈ ΩB} are orthonormal
bases for registers A and B, respectively. (Note that |α〉
here is not a coherent state discussed in the main text.)
We remark that KAa and K
B
b are the same as defined in
Eqs. (40) and (41) of Ref. [22] if we write fa(α) as αa
and fb(β) as βb. Then WA, WB , VS are defined as
WA =
∑
a∈SA
KAa ⊗ |a〉E
A˜
,
WB =
∑
b∈SB
KBb ⊗ |b〉E
B˜
,
VS = Π⊗ |K〉S ⊗ |K〉ES + (1A˜B˜ −Π)⊗ |D〉S ⊗ |D〉ES ,
(A2)
where Π =
∑
(a,b)∈K |a〉〈a|A˜⊗|b〉〈b|B˜ and {|K〉 , |D〉} is an
orthonormal basis for the register S (ES). To write out
the key map isometry VK , we take the reverse reconcili-
ation schemes as an example and it is straightforward to
write out VK in the case of direct reconciliation schemes
by using Alice’s measurement outcome fa(α) instead of
Bob’s outcome fb(β). We first define an (partial) isom-
etry V on the subspace that Π projects onto and then
write out VK :
V =
∑
(a,b)∈K
β∈ΩB
|g(a, b, fb(β))〉R ⊗ |a〉〈a|A˜ ⊗ |b〉〈b|B˜ ⊗ |β〉〈β|B ,
VK = VΠ+ |⊥〉R ⊗ (1A˜B˜ −Π).
(A3)
We remark that the final state ρ
(3)
R[A][B]S[E] =
VKVS(WA⊗WB)ρABE(WA⊗WB)†V †SV †K is a pure state
since ρABE is a pure state and we only apply isometries
to it.
2. Removing the dependence on Eve’s registers
To access the key information, we use the projective
measurement {Zj = |j〉〈j|R : j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N − 1,⊥}}.
Since the final state ρ
(3)
R[A][B]S[E] is pure, we apply Theo-
rem 1 of Ref. [41] to rewrite conditional entropyH(Z|[E])
as
H(Z|[E]) = D(ρ(3)R[A][B]S||
∑
j
Zjρ
(3)
R[A][B]SZj), (A4)
where ρ
(3)
R[A][B]S = Tr[E](ρ
(3)
R[A][B]S[E]). We then de-
fine an announcement map A for an input state σ as
A(σ) = ∑a∈SA∑b∈SB (KAa ⊗ KBb )σ(KAa ⊗ KBb )† and
rewrite ρ
(3)
R[A][B]S as
ρ
(3)
R[A][B]S =Tr[E](ρ
(3)
R[A][B]S[E])
=ppassρ
K
R[A][B] ⊗ |K〉〈K|S
+ (1 − ppass)ρDR[A][B] ⊗ |D〉〈D|S ,
(A5)
where ppass = Tr
(
VΠA(ρAB)ΠV †
)
= Tr(A(ρAB)Π) is
the same sifting probability defined in the main text and
ρKR[A][B] =
VΠA(ρAB)ΠV †
ppass
,
ρDR[A][B] =
|⊥〉〈⊥|R ⊗ (1A˜B˜ −Π)A(ρAB)(1A˜B˜ −Π)
1− ppass .
(A6)
To show that the symbol ⊥ has no contribution to the
key rate, we use the following lemma (see Ref. [42]).
Lemma 1 For quantum-classical states ρQX and σQX
defined as ρQX =
∑
x p(x)ρ
x
Q ⊗ |x〉〈x|X , σQX =∑
x q(x)σ
x
Q ⊗ |x〉〈x|X , where p and q are probability dis-
tributions over a finite alphabet X and ρxQ, σxQ are density
operators for all x ∈ X , the quantum relative entropy is
D(ρQX ||σQX) =
∑
x p(x)D(ρ
x
Q||σxQ) +D(p||q).
Applying the lemma to the state ρ
(3)
R[A][B]S with the
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classical register S gives us
D(ρ
(3)
R[A][B]S||Z(ρ(3)R[A][B]S))
= ppassD(ρ
K
R[A][B]||Z(ρKR[A][B]))
+ (1− ppass)D(ρDR[A][B]||ρDR[A][B])
= ppassD(ρ
K
R[A][B]||Z(ρKR[A][B]))
= D(G(ρAB)||Z(G(ρAB))),
(A7)
where we define G(ρAB) = VΠA(ρAB)ΠV †, which is the
same as in Ref. [22].
Finally, we remark that on the subspace where Π
projects, the symbol ⊥ does not show up anymore. Thus,
we can modify {Zj} to remove the symbol ⊥ in the end.
This gives back to the definition of Z shown in Ref. [22].
3. Simplifying the postprocessing map
We now provide several remarks to explain how we can
simplify the map G while making sure that such a sim-
plification does not change our calculated key rate. Our
discussion here takes the reverse reconciliation schemes
as an example. It is straightforward to adapt the argu-
ments to the direct reconciliation schemes.
We first make a remark about the registers A˜copy and
B˜copy that are hidden in our notation A˜ and B˜. Af-
ter tracing out Eve’s registers EA˜ and EB˜ , Alice’s regis-
ter A˜ and Bob’s copy A˜copy are both classical registers
and likewise, Bob’s register B˜ and Alice’s copy B˜copy
are classical. Since each of the sifting and key map
steps is done locally via a controlled unitary whose tar-
get is the register S or R alone, we can pull out two
copies of registers A˜ and B˜ to write the final state in the
form of the quantum-classical state to which the previous
lemma applies. If we look at the block diagonal struc-
ture of G(ρAB) with respect to two copies of the register
A˜, we see directly that the state with a single copy of
the register A˜ is just embedded in a larger space with
two copies of the register A˜. This means the eigenval-
ues of the state is unaffected by removing one copy of
the register A˜. A similar argument works for two copies
of B˜. Moreover, from the previous lemma, we see im-
mediately that we can calculate the key rate from in-
dividual announcements if we write the key map g as
g(a, b, fb(β)) =: gab(β) for a collection of functions gab,
one for each (a, b) ∈ K. In this case, for each (a, b) ∈ K,
we define an isometry Vab =
∑
β∈ΩB |gab(β)〉R ⊗ |β〉〈β|B
and a completely positive map Gab for an input state σ
as Gab(σ) = Vab(K˜Aa ⊗ K˜Bb )σ(K˜Aa ⊗ K˜Bb )†V †ab, where we
define K˜Aa such that K
A
a = K˜
A
a ⊗|a〉A˜ and K˜Bb such that
KBb = K˜
B
b ⊗ |b〉B˜. Then,
D(G(ρAB)||Z(G(ρAB)))
=
∑
(a,b)∈K
D(Gab(ρAB)||Z(Gab(ρAB))). (A8)
Alice
Bob
Eve
A
UAA
UAM
A
A˜
B˜copy
A˜copy
B˜
UBCB
UBF
B
E
E
A˜
E
B˜
ρABE
ρ
(1)
[A][B]EEA˜EB˜
FIG. 12. An alternative description of the announcement step
for the reverse reconciliation schemes. This step can be de-
composed into two steps. At the first step, Alice only per-
forms a coarse-grained measurement with a unitary UAA to
obtain announcement results and Bob also performs a coarse-
grained measurement with a unitary UBC to obtain announce-
ment outcomes and coarse-grained measurement information.
At the second step, they choose to perform optional refined
measurements (UAM and U
B
F ) conditioned on the announce-
ments (and previous coarse-grained measurement information
for Bob). They can postpone the refined measurements after
giving Eve announcement results and in some cases choose
not to perform the refined measurements.
Besides the lemma, our objective function has another
important property. Since the quantum relative entropy
is invariant under an isometry, if an isometry can com-
mute with G and Z maps, then our objective function
is also invariant under this isometry. In other words, we
can add or remove an isometry W (that only acts on Al-
ice’s and Bob’s registers) in the final expression of Eq.
(A7) if W commutes with G and Z maps.
From this property of our objective function, if those
functions gab’s are the identity function, then we see that
each isometry Vab simply copies the register B and stores
this copy to the register R. Removing this copy is a local
isometry and renaming the register B by the name R is
a unitary. Thus, we can combine the registers B and R
and retain the name of R.
Also from this property of our objective function, we
now discuss when we can omit the appearance of the
register A. As depicted in Fig. 12, the announce-
ment and measurement step can be decomposed into two
steps. First, Alice performs a coarse-grained measure-
ment (with associated unitary UAA in this figure) to make
announcements. Second, conditioned on her own an-
nouncement result, Alice performs a refined measurement
(with a controlled unitary UAM in the figure) if needed
to obtain the fine-grained measurement outcomes. As
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the refined measurement is done in Alice’s local regis-
ters to which Eve has no access, Alice’s refined measure-
ment can be described by a local isometry. This local
isometry can be performed after Eve obtains a copy of
the announcement registers. In the reverse reconcilia-
tion scheme, since the key map isometry V does not
depend on the register A, the isometry that describes
Alice’s refined measurement then commutes with G and
Z maps. This means that from the key rate calcula-
tion perspective, we can drop this isometry due to the
property of our objective function. More precisely, if we
define PAa =
∑
α∈ΩA P
A
(a,fa(α))
for each a ∈ SA and de-
fine KA
′
a =
√
PAa ⊗ |a〉A˜, then we can replace the map G
by the map G′ defined as
G′(σ) = VΠ
( ∑
a∈SA
∑
b∈SB
(KA
′
a ⊗KB)σ(KA
′
a ⊗KBb )†
)
ΠV †
(A9)
for an input state σ. (A similar replacement can be done
for Gab.) A similar argument can be applied to the di-
rect reconciliation schemes by interchanging the roles of
Alice’s and Bob’s registers to show that we can omit the
register B for direct reconciliation.
Along the same line of argument, we remark that the
refined measurement conditioned on the announcements
can be coarse-grained instead of the fine-grained mea-
surement if the key map only uses the coarse-grained in-
formation. This process is also described in Fig. 12. Bob
first applies an isometry (with associated unitary UBC in
the figure) to implement the coarse-grained measurement
which gives the same coarse-grained information needed
for the key map g and then applies an additional isome-
try (with associated unitary UBF in the figure) to obtain
fine-grained measurement outcomes. As the sifting step
only depends on the announcement, we can move Bob’s
refined measurement after the sifting step (not shown
in this figure). Since the key map only uses the coarse-
grained information, the key map isometry effectively un-
does the unitary UBF . Therefore, we can take the POVM
related to the coarse-grained measurement when we write
out Kraus operators KBb in Eq. (A1).
Finally, we explain how we derive the Kraus operators
shown in Eqs. (17) and (21). First, since we consider the
reverse reconciliation schemes, we can omit the measure-
ment outcome register A. Second, since the key map of
each protocol only uses the coarse-grained measurement
outcomes, instead of using Bob’s fine-grained POVM cor-
responding to homodyne or heterodyne measurements,
we use the coarse-grained POVM ({I0, I1,1−I0−I1} for
protocol 1 and {R0, R1, R2, R3,1−
∑3
j=0 Rj} for protocol
2). Since the setK contains only one element, we are left
with only one term in the summation of Eq. (A8) after
removing registers A˜ and B˜. Finally, the key map in this
case is the identity map. Thus, we combine registers R
and B and retain the name R for this combined register.
Appendix B: Operators with photon number cutoff
Let N denote the photon-number basis up to Nc,
that is, N = {|0〉 , . . . , |Nc〉}. In this work, we have
imposed a photon number cutoff assumption, that is,
ρAB = (1A ⊗ ΠNc)ρAB(1A ⊗ ΠNc) with the projection
ΠNc onto the subspace spanned by the basis N . Since
Alice’s system is irrelevant for our discussion here, we
focus on the conditional states ρxB in the following dis-
cussion. For any operator Oˆ acting on Bob’s system, we
observe that
Tr
[
ρxBOˆ
]
= Tr
[
ΠNcρ
x
BΠNcOˆ
]
= Tr
[
(ΠNcρ
x
BΠNc)(ΠNcOˆΠNc)
]
.
(B1)
This allows us to define the truncated version of the op-
erator Oˆ by ΠNcOˆΠNc . In our optimization problem
[see Eq. (16)], the relevant operators are of the forms
ΠNcρ
x
BΠNc and ΠNcOˆΠNc , which have finite-dimensional
matrix representations. Specifically, we can find a matrix
representation of Oˆ in the basis N . We start by writ-
ing out the annihilation operator aˆ in this basis and then
creation operator aˆ† is just its conjugate transpose. Con-
sequently, other relevant operators qˆ, pˆ, nˆ and dˆ can be
written directly following from their definitions in terms
of aˆ and aˆ†. In this basis,
ΠNc aˆΠNc =

0 1 0 0 · · · 0
0 0
√
2 0 · · · 0
...
. . .
...
0 · · · 0 √Nc
0 · · · 0 0
 . (B2)
It is not difficult to write out the interval operators
I0, I1 and region operators R0, R1, R2 and R3 in this
basis. To do so, we use the overlap 〈q|n〉 between a
quadrature eigenstate |q〉 and a photon-number state |n〉
and the overlap
〈
γeiθ
∣∣n〉 between a coherent state ∣∣γeiθ〉
and a photon-number state |n〉. With our definition of
quadrature operators in Eq. (15), the overlaps 〈q|n〉 and〈
γeiθ
∣∣n〉 read [43]
〈q|n〉 = 1√
π
1
2 2n(n!)
exp
(
−q
2
2
)
Hn(q),
〈
γeiθ
∣∣n〉 = e− γ22 γne−inθ√
n!
,
(B3)
where Hn is the Hermite polynomial of order n. We
then perform the relevant integrals to obtain a finite-
dimensional matrix representation in this basis.
Finally, in the expression of the Kraus operators shown
in Eqs. (17) and (21), we need to take the square root
of each of the interval operators I0, I1 or region opera-
tors R0, R1, R2 and R3. Even though these operators are
projective on the entire infinite-dimensional space such
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that the square root of each operator is itself, the trun-
cated version of each such operator is no longer projective
in the finite-dimensional subspace spanned by the basis
N . Thus, a caution about the ordering of truncation and
square root is needed. We now explain the proper way to
handle this. With the photon number cutoff assumption
ρ = ΠNcρΠNc , we see from Eq. (B1) that for a POVM
element F on the infinite-dimensional space, the corre-
sponding POVM element on this finite-dimensional sub-
space becomes ΠNcFΠNc . As we know from Appendix
A, the purpose of taking the square root of a POVM
element is to realize this POVM measurement in an iso-
metric fashion. Since the relevant POVM element on
this finite-dimensional subspace is ΠNcFΠNc , we need to
take the square root of ΠNcFΠNc . This means we take
the truncation first and then take the square root.
Appendix C: Evaluation of loss-only key rate
We discuss how to evaluate the Devetak-Winter for-
mula in the loss-only scenario in the absence of posts-
election. When Alice sends |αx〉A′ to Bob, in the ab-
sence of noise, Bob can verify that he receives a pure
coherent state via homodyne or heterodyne detections.
In the case of homodyne detection, Bob can verify that
the received state is a minimum uncertainty state with
the same variance for both quadratures, which implies
it is a pure coherent state. In the case heterodyne de-
tection, Bob performs a tomography to verify that the
received state is a pure coherent state. In particular
if Bob verifies his state to be an attenuated coherent
state
∣∣√ηαx〉, it has been shown [20] that Eve’s opti-
mal attack is the generalized beamsplitting attack for
this pure-loss channel. Thus, the state shared by Bob
and Eve becomes
∣∣√ηαx〉B ∣∣√1− ηαx〉E after this chan-
nel. Due to the product state structure of Bob and Eve’s
joint state, Bob’s measurement outcome does not influ-
ence Eve’s state. Therefore, conditioned on the value x
of Alice’s string X and the value z in Bob’s raw key Z,
Eve’s conditional state |ǫx,z〉 is
|ǫx,z〉 =
∣∣∣√1− ηαx〉 := |ǫx〉 , (C1)
which is independent from z and thus we call it |ǫx〉 for
simplicity.
1. Protocol 1
The procedure outlined here is similar to the calcula-
tion in Ref. [20]. For the protocol 1, since αx ∈ {α,−α},
Eve’s conditional states |ǫx〉 are either
∣∣√1− ηα〉 or∣∣−√1− ηα〉, which only span a two-dimensional sub-
space. We can find a two-dimensional representation of
|ǫx〉 as
|ǫ0〉 =
∣∣∣√1− ηα〉 = c0 |e0〉+ c1 |e1〉 ,
|ǫ1〉 =
∣∣∣−√1− ηα〉 = c0 |e0〉 − c1 |e1〉 , (C2)
where |e0〉 , |e1〉 are defined as
|e0〉 = 1√
cosh[(1 − η)α2]
∞∑
n=0
(
√
1− ηα)2n√
(2n)!
|2n〉 ,
|e1〉 = 1√
sinh[(1 − η)α2]
∞∑
n=0
(
√
1− ηα)2n+1√
(2n+ 1)!
|2n+ 1〉 ,
(C3)
and c0 = e
− (1−η)α22
√
cosh[(1 − η)α2] and c1 =
e−
(1−η)α2
2
√
sinh[(1 − η)α2].
We now directly evaluate the Devetak-Winter formula
R∞ = βI(X;Z) − χ(Z : E). (C4)
We obtain I(X;Z) by calculation similar to Eq. (28).
We can directly calculate χ(Z : E) via
χ(Z : E) = H(ρE)−
1∑
j=0
P (z = j)H(ρE,j), (C5)
where H(σ) = −Tr(σ log2 σ) is the von Neumann en-
tropy and the relevant states are
ρE,j =
1∑
i=0
P (x = i, z = j)
P (z = j)
|ǫi〉〈ǫi| ,
ρE =
1∑
j=0
P (z = j)ρE,j ,
(C6)
where P (x, z) is the joint probability distribution of x
and z and P (z) is the marginal probability distribu-
tion of z. These relevant Eve’s states |ǫx〉 all have
a two-dimensional matrix representation in the basis
{|e0〉 , |e1〉} and thus it is straightforward to directly eval-
uate the Devetak-Winter formula.
2. Protocol 2
For the protocol 2, since αx ∈ {α, iα,−α,−iα},
Eve’s conditional states |ǫx〉 are
∣∣√1− ηα〉, ∣∣i√1− ηα〉,∣∣−√1− ηα〉 ∣∣−i√1− ηα〉, which only span a four-
dimensional subspace. Therefore, we can find an
orthonormal basis {|f0〉 , |f1〉 , |f2〉 , |f3〉} for this sub-
space similar to the basis {|e0〉 , |e1〉} and find a four-
dimensional matrix presentation for each of Eve’s condi-
tional states (see Ref. [44] for an explicit expression). All
the procedures are similar to protocol 1 except that the
summation indexes i, j now run from 0 to 3 instead of
0 to 1 in Eqs. (C5) and (C6). With a four-dimensional
matrix representation of Eve’s conditional states |ǫx〉 in
the basis {|f0〉 , |f1〉 , |f2〉 , |f3〉}, it is also straightforward
to directly evaluate the Devetak-Winter formula.
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